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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 784 
Accident time: 09:45 Accident Date: 14/09/2008 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: (36) Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
1 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT # 23 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
A BOI investigation team was convened by UNMACA to investigate the fatal demining 
accident involving [the Victim] the deminer from [Demining group] DT-23. The accident 
occurred at 09:45 am on 14 September 2008 at minefield # AF/2201/22726/0105, located in 
Ghughula city, centre of Bamyan province. 
SUMMARY: 
It is the view of the BOI team that after removing his PPE and helmet the deminer has moved 
back into his lane to place marking in cleared area that he believed to be safe and free of any 
mines. He may have done this as he was aware that a “delegation” was about to visit the site 
and he wanted to make sure that his marking was correct. He did receive a large chest wound 
and several facial wounds that suggest the deminer was struck by rocks thrown up from the 
mine detonation. There was also some minor blast related injuries to his lower legs. There 
were no wounds to the deminer’s hands or feet so he did not initiate the mine by standing on 
or touching it. 
The BOI team believes this detonation may have occurred as a result of the deminer having 
leant forward from a safe point and thrown a marking stone down onto the ground. His aim 
may have been off and he may have inadvertently thrown the stone onto a mine that had not 
previously been found in the lane. The mine has detonated, propelling the marking stone and 
other stones back at him with the marking stone striking him in the chest and the remaining 
stones having caused the injuries around the forehead and eyes. Unfortunately these injuries 
have resulted in his death at the scene before he could receive any medical treatment for his 
injuries. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
It is the BOI conclusion that the deminer, [the Victim], was not clearly marking his lane 
progressively throughout the course of the day. He has moved back into his clearance lane 
during a break period, without wearing his PPE and helmet, to place a marking stone. He has 
not wanted to get to close to the unsafe area and has leant forward and thrown the marking 
stone forward to mark the lane. This stone has landed on a mine with the detonation causing 
the stones to be thrown up from the blast and inflicting the injuries that have resulted in his 
death. It seems that the poor supervision and carelessness of deminer himself are the 
contributing factors to the accident.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The BOI recommend that all organisations are reminded the following;  
a. Full PPE and helmet must be worn correctly at all times in a hazardous area.  
b. If PPE and/or the helmets are removed whilst undertaking rest breaks then individuals are 
not to move from their position in the safe area until they have re-dressed in the PPE and 
helmet.  
c. Under no circumstances are deminers to carry out any work during the rest period.  
d. The marking of lanes shall take place progressively and in accordance with the procedure. 
If a deminer has not had the opportunity to complete his marking at the sounding of a break 
then he is to complete the marking procedure before moving out of his lane to take the break. 
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e. The command group of all demining teams are to strengthen their supervision and do not 
let the deminers to work without PPE.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 970 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Legs; severe Chest; severe Eyes; severe Face 
FATAL 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . injuries around the forehead and 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was working in the minefield without PPE and his error was not corrected. The secondary 
cause is listed as Victim Inattention because the investigators found that the Victim had 
inadvertently thrown a rock onto a mine “that had not previously been found in the lane”.  
It is likely that the rock was not thrown far. Stones tend to break up in a blast and the parts 
lose their momentum quickly, so the fatal chest would was probably caused by a mine 
detonating at a distance of less than two metres.                                                                        
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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